Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 37, Issue 6, pp 613–643

Goodman’s “New Riddle”

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s10992-008-9083-5

Cite this article as:
Fitelson, B. J Philos Logic (2008) 37: 613. doi:10.1007/s10992-008-9083-5

Abstract

First, a brief historical trace of the developments in confirmation theory leading up to Goodman’s infamous “grue” paradox is presented. Then, Goodman’s argument is analyzed from both Hempelian and Bayesian perspectives. A guiding analogy is drawn between certain arguments against classical deductive logic, and Goodman’s “grue” argument against classical inductive logic. The upshot of this analogy is that the “New Riddle” is not as vexing as many commentators have claimed (especially, from a Bayesian inductive-logical point of view). Specifically, the analogy reveals an intimate connection between Goodman’s problem, and the “problem of old evidence”. Several other novel aspects of Goodman’s argument are also discussed (mainly, from a Bayesian perspective).

Key words

Bayesian Carnap Confirmation Goodman Grue Hempel 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of California–BerkeleyBerkeleyUSA

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