Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 36, Issue 6, pp 659–694 | Cite as

LOGICAL PLURALISM AND SEMANTIC INFORMATION

Article

Abstract

Up to now theories of semantic information have implicitly relied on logical monism, or the view that there is one true logic. The latter position has been explicitly challenged by logical pluralists. Adopting an unbiased attitude in the philosophy of information, we take a suggestion from Beall and Restall at heart and exploit logical pluralism to recognise another kind of pluralism. The latter is called informational pluralism, a thesis whose implications for a theory of semantic information we explore.

Key words

logical pluralism semantic information substructural logics 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Centre for Logic and Philosophy of ScienceVrije Universiteit BrusselBrusselsBelgium
  2. 2.IEG – OUCL and Faculty of PhilosophyOxford UniversityOxfordUK

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