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Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 35, Issue 3, pp 231–237 | Cite as

Remarks on Penrose’s “New Argument”

  • Per LindströmEmail author
Article

Abstract

It is commonly agreed that the well-known Lucas–Penrose arguments and even Penrose’s ‘new argument’ in [Penrose, R. (1994): Shadows of the Mind, Oxford University Press] are inconclusive. It is, perhaps, less clear exactly why at least the latter is inconclusive. This note continues the discussion in [Lindström, P. (2001): Penrose’s new argument, J. Philos. Logic 30, 241–250; Shapiro, S.(2003): Mechanism, truth, and Penrose’s new argument, J. Philos. Logic 32, 19–42] and elsewhere of this question.

Key Words

knowability (in mathematics) Lucas–Penrose thesis 

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References

  1. 1.
    Chalmers, D. J. (1995): Minds, machines, and mathematics. A review of Shadows of the Mind by Roger Penrose, Psyche 2, (http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au).
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    Lindström, P. (2001): Penrose’s new argument, J. Philos. Logic 30, 241–250.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. 3.
    Penrose, R. (1994): Shadows of the Mind, Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
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    Penrose, R. (1995): Beyond the doubting of a shadow. A reply to commentaries on Shadows of the Mind, Psyche 2, (http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au).
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    Shapiro, S. (2003): Mechanism, truth, and Penrose’s new argument, J. Philos. Logic 32, 19–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.TolleredSweden

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