Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 35, Issue 2, pp 117–145 | Cite as

What Might be the Case after a Change in View



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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of MichiganAnn ArborUSA

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