Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 34, Issue 4, pp 403–431 | Cite as

On the Axiomatisation of Elgesem's Logic of Agency and Ability

Article

Abstract

In this paper we show that the Hilbert system of agency and ability presented by Dag Elgesem is incomplete with respect to the intended semantics. We argue that completeness result may be easily regained. Finally, we shortly discuss some issues related to the philosophical intuition behind his approach. This is done by examining Elgesem's modal logic of agency and ability using semantics with different flavours.

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Copyright information

© Springer 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Information Technology and Electrical EngineeringThe University of QueenslandBrisbaneAustralia
  2. 2.CIRSFID, Law FacultyUniversity of BolognaBolognaItaly

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