Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 34, Issue 2, pp 155–192 | Cite as

What Truth Depends on

  • Hannes Leitgeb


What kinds of sentences with truth predicate may be inserted plausibly and consistently into the T-scheme? We state an answer in terms of dependence: those sentences which depend directly or indirectly on non-semantic states of affairs (only). In order to make this precise we introduce a theory of dependence according to which a sentence φ is said to depend on a set Φ of sentences iff the truth value of φ supervenes on the presence or absence of the sentences of Φ in/from the extension of the truth predicate. Both φ and the members of Φ are allowed to contain the truth predicate. On that basis we are able define notions such as ungroundedness or self-referentiality within a classical semantics, and we can show that there is an adequate definition of truth for the class of sentences which depend on non-semantic states of affairs.


dependence self-referentiality supervenience truth ungroundedness 


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Copyright information

© Springer 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hannes Leitgeb
    • 1
  1. 1.Dept. of PhilosophyUniv. of SalzburgAustria

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