This article explores meaning of the rule of law for Egypt after Mubarak. In Egypt, the process of writing and ratifying a new constitution was overseen first by Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), then by the newly elected President Morsi and by SCAF again, when the army moved to depose Mr Morsi and the government of the Muslim Brotherhood party. The writing of the Egyptian constitution has undergone several iterations since 2011, each time slanted towards the interests of those in power. The successful implementation of the rule of law in any country must first be secured in the constitutional framework which should guarantee that everyone is equal before the law and that no person or group has a privileged status. Does the latest Egyptian constitution meet this most basic of criterion of the rule of law?
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Taher (Winter 2013, pp. 25–36).
See Moustafa (2007).
Hirschl (2004, pp. 1819–1860).
Ibid (2004, p. 1825). See also Moustafa (2007). He claims that the Egyptian Regime established an independent constitutional court to address a series of economic and administrative issues. The court fulfilled its mandate to “institutionalise state functions and attract investment” but it also affirmed certain civil and political rights enabling challenges to the regime.
Choudhry (2013, p. 611).
Tschirgi et al. (2013, p. 2).
Fukuyama (1989); see also Fukuyama (1992).
Aristotle, Tr. Sinclair (1962, pp. 142–145).
See note 9, p. 26.
Locke (1690, II, xi, para, p. 136).
Fuller (1964, p. 106).
Dicey (1960, p. 187).
See note 14, p. 198.
Ibid (1964, p. 42).
Ibid (1964, pp. 33–94).
See note 9, p. 3.
“We acknowledge that good governance and the rule of law at the national and international levels are essential for sustained economic growth, sustainable development and the eradication of poverty and hunger.” UN GA Resolution 05-48760, October 2005 World Summit.
Raz (1983, pp. 214–216).
Mohan, Holligan and Shiow Tsai in (Ed) Spitzkatz (2013, p. 15).
See note 9, p. 34.
Democracy and the rule of law are not necessarily compatible. They have come to form a cluster of ideals that are associated with liberal democracy. See Michael Rosenfeld (2001, p. 1307).
See note 9, p. 34.
Allan (2010, p. 4).
Quoted in Tamanaha (2004, p. 34).
Ibid (2004, p. 41).
Hayek (1960) For Hayek, limiting discretion by government officials was an important part of the rule of law since government actions have to be predictable.
Przeworski in (Eds) Maravall and Przeworski (2003, p. 114).
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Huntington (1993, pp. 22–49).
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Bayat quoted in Ibid (2013, p. 298).
The slogans on placards carried by the demonstrators in Tahir square were “Constitution First!” and “No principles above the constitution” Ibid (2013, p. 297).
See note 33.
See Santos’s examination of the connection between the rule of law and economic development. “The idea that the legal system is crucial for economic growth now forms part of the conventional wisdom of development theory” As a consequence effort and resources were put into encouraging the rule of law with the expectation that economic growth will follow. Santos finds that “By many compelling accounts these projects have been disappointing, failing to deliver the expected results.” in Trubek and Santos (2006, p. 253).
See the effort by the ‘World Justice Program’ (WJP), a 2007 initiative of the American Bar Association which publishes a Rule of Law Index where countries are rated in terms of 47 key indicators which relate to eight main themes. A country scores well on the WJP rule of law index if it can demonstrate that its legal system conforms to the standards of legality summarised by Lon Fuller, and also that the substantive law shows a commitment to human rights, especially the protection of property. WJP Rule of Law Index 2014 worldjusticeproject.org.
See note 34, p. 123.
“In countries with per capita income under $1,000, the probability that a democracy would die during a particular year was 0.6136, which implies that its expected life was about six years. Between $1,001 and $3,000, this probability was 0.0561, for an expected duration of about eighteen years. Between $3,001 and $6,055, the probability was 0.0216, which translates into about forty-six years of expected life.” Ibid (2003, pp. 114/115).
GDP per capita (current US $) World Bank http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.
Maravall and Prezeworski (Eds) (2003, p. 1).
Holmes in Maravall and Przeworski (2003, pp. 19–61).
Ibid (2003, p. 20).
Ibid (2003, p. 21).
The authors concluded “…that majorities of the American public actually have little influence over the policies our government adopts” and “that if policy making is dominated by powerful business organisations and a small number of affluent Americans, then America’s claims to being democratic are seriously threatened.” The study revealed that the majority of US citizens are powerless having a “statistically non-significant impact upon public policy.” Ibid (2014, p. 24).
See note 50, p. 22.
Ibid (2003, p. 32).
See note 48, p. 22.
See note 56, p. 47.
Ibid (2003, p. 49).
Ibid (2003, p. 23).
Waldron (2008, p. 60).
Lang (2013, p. 344).
Hashim (2011, p. 109).
Tschirgi et al. (2013, p. 5).
See note 65, p. 108.
See note 66, p. 4.
Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Retry or Free 12,000 After Unfair Military Trials,” September 10, 2011 http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/09/10 quoted in Ibid p. 2.
Taher (2013, pp. 25–36).
See note 38, p. 304.
Azzam (2012, p. 4).
Ganzouri first served as prime minister of Egypt between 1996 and 1999. SCAF appointed him on 21 November 2011 to form a coalition government. He finally resigned in June 2012, when Mohammed Morsi was elected prime minister.
See note 38, p. 297.
Ibid p. 304.
Ibid p. 305.
See note 63, p. 359. The jurisdiction of the Egyptian State Council is over administrative disputes where the state is one of the parties. It has the power to strike down n government decisions.
See Anderson (1983).
A similar occurrence can be noted in Sri Lanka and other states in the Middle East.
Quoted in Aly and Werner (1964, p. 338).
It would be wrong to assume that the interests represented by the Islamist groups and the army are mutually exclusive. The assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981 revealed the extent to which Islamist ideology had penetrated the army. Sadat’s assassins were officers of the army Colonel Abboud Zumur, Lieutenant Khalid al-Islambouli, Sergent Hussein Abbas and Islamists. See note 65, p. 108.
See note 65, p. 305.
See note 72, p. 4.
Sarah El Deeb “Morsi Power Grab: Egypt’s Top courts Protest President’s Decrees” The World Post http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/28.
See note 38, p. 297.
Ibid, p. 305.
47 % Muslim Brotherhood, 24 % Salafists’ al Nour party, the rest of the votes were shared by Liberal Wafd and Egyptian Bloc coalition. See note 72, p. 4.
“Egypt: President Morsi orders dissolved parliament back.” CBS News, 8 July 2012 http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57468252/egypt-presidnet-morsi-orders-dissolved-parliament-back/.
See note 70, p. 27.
In effect this meant that all Constitutional Declarations, laws and decrees made by the president since he assumed office on 30 June 2012 were binding and could not be appealed until a new constitution was adopted. http://English.ahram.org.g/News/58947.aspx.
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See note 70, p. 28.
See note 85.
Dutch MEP Marietje Schaake claimed that Morsi had ‘placed himself and all his decisions above the law’. Quoted in Pinfari (2013).
See note 38, p. 304.
N Youssef “Egypt’s draft constitution translated” http://www.egyptindependent.com/news 02/12/2012.
See note 70, p. 35. See also Armojand who claims that the vested interests of the army is protected mainly through “constitutional gaps”—that is, by omissions in the constitution on important matters concerning defence and security services.
See note 66, p. 1.
Tamarrod, a revolt movement, claimed that 22 million signatories demanded that either Mr Morsi resign or call early presidential elections.
Housden (2013, pp. 72–78, 73).
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Full Text of the July 2013 Egyptian Constitutional Declaration (full Text Egyptian State Information Service) http://egyptianelections.carnegieendowment.org/2013/07/15fulltext.
Maggie Michael The international monitoring group claimed that there was a “clampdown on free speech ahead of the charter.” “Official: Egyptian voters have backed new charter.” http://news.yahoo.com/official-egyptian-voters-backed-charter-100856281.html.
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Pillay, N. The Rule of Law and the New Egyptian Constitution. Liverpool Law Rev 35, 135–155 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10991-014-9156-1
- Rule of law
- Middle East