Linguistics and Philosophy

, Volume 39, Issue 4, pp 333–355 | Cite as

Three notions of dynamicness in language

  • Daniel Rothschild
  • Seth Yalcin
Research Article


We distinguish three ways that a theory of linguistic meaning and communication might be considered dynamic in character. We provide some examples of systems which are dynamic in some of these senses but not others. We suggest that separating these notions can help to clarify what is at issue in particular debates about dynamic versus static approaches within natural language semantics and pragmatics.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity College LondonLondonUK
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of CaliforniaBerkeleyUSA

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