Linguistics and Philosophy

, Volume 34, Issue 6, pp 571–588 | Cite as

Sub-sentential speech and the traditional view

  • Stefano PredelliEmail author
Research Article


This essay argues that cases of apparently sub-sentential speech, such as Charles’ utterance of ‘a world famous topologist’ in the presence of a suitably salient woman, are unproblematic from the viewpoint of the Traditional View of meaning and truth-conditions. My argument is grounded on the distinction between different senses of ‘truth-conditions’ in double-index semantics, and on an understanding of semantic inputs as constraints on logical forms. Given these conceptual resources, I argue that an utterly traditional understanding of the relationships between meaning and truth yields the intuitively desired results.


Semantics Pragmatics Truth-conditional pragmatics 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of NottinghamNottinghamUK

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