Linguistics and Philosophy

, Volume 30, Issue 3, pp 329–360 | Cite as

Counterfactual scorekeeping

  • Anthony S. Gillies
Research Article


Orthodoxy has it that counterfactuals cannot be treated as strict conditionals. But there is a loophole: if the strictness is a function of context then maybe they can be so treated. I argue for a loophole analysis that treats ‘would’-counterfactuals as strict conditionals that are duals to ‘might’- counterfactuals. Most of the work lies in getting straight about the interaction between context and semantic value. I treat it as a general feature of the dynamics of conversational score.


Counterfactuals Conditionals Update semantics 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of MichiganAnn ArborUSA

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