Law and Philosophy

, Volume 32, Issue 1, pp 109–127 | Cite as

Punishment and the Duties of Offenders

  • R. A. DuffEmail author


This paper offers a partial critique of one of the central lines of argument in Victor Tadros’ The Ends of Harm: his attempt to show that a system of deterrent punishment can avoid the objection that it treats those who are punished ‘merely as means’ to our goals, by arguing that we may legitimately use someone as a means if in doing so we are simply forcing her to do what she anyway had an enforceable duty to do. I raise some questions about the idea of forcing someone to do what she has a duty to do; about what duties a wrongdoer incurs towards his victim, and how they may be enforced; and about whether we can move from such duties to a justification of criminal punishment as a deterrent.


Restorative Justice Potential Victim Criminal Punishment Criminal Wrongdoer Future Harm 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Law SchoolUniversity of MinnesotaMinneapolisUSA
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of StirlingStirlingScotland, UK

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