Law and Philosophy

, Volume 31, Issue 6, pp 619–642 | Cite as

Erratum to: Implications of Indeterminacy: Naturalism in Epistemology and the Philosophy of Law II

Erratum

References

  1. Adler, M., and Himma, K. E. (eds.), The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).Google Scholar
  2. Alexander, L., ‘All or Nothing at All? The Intentions of Authorities and the Authority of Intentions.’ In Marmor, A. (Ed.), Law and Interpretation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).Google Scholar
  3. Alexander, L., and Prakash, S., ‘Is That English You’re Speaking? Why Intention Free Interpretation is an Impossibility’, San Diego Law Review 41 (2004): 967–995.Google Scholar
  4. Boudreau, C., Lupia, A., McCubbins, M. D., and Rodriguez, D. B., ‘What Statutes Mean: Interpretive Lessons from Positive Theories of Communication and Legislation’, San Diego Law Review 44 (2007): 957–992.Google Scholar
  5. Campos, P., ‘Against Constitutional Theory’, Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities 4 (1992): 279.Google Scholar
  6. Campos, P., ‘Three Mistakes About Interpretation’, Michigan Law Review 92 (1993a): 388–397.Google Scholar
  7. Campos, P., ‘That Obscure Object of Desire: Hermeneutics and the Autonomous Legal Text’, Minnesota Law Review 77 (1993b): 1065.Google Scholar
  8. Coleman, J. (ed.), Hart’s Postscript (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).Google Scholar
  9. Collins, J., and Peacocke, C., ‘Special Issue: Epistemic Norms’, Journal of Philosophy 105 (2008): 441–663.Google Scholar
  10. Dworkin, R., Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977).Google Scholar
  11. Dworkin, R., Law’s Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986).Google Scholar
  12. Dworkin, R., ‘Pragmatism, Right Answers, and True Banality.’ In Brint, M., and Weaver, W. (eds.), Pragmatism in Law and Society (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991).Google Scholar
  13. Dworkin, R., Justice in Robes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).Google Scholar
  14. Fish, S., ‘There is no Textualist Position’, San Diego Law Review 42 (2005): 629–650.Google Scholar
  15. Greenberg, M., ‘How Facts Make Law’, Legal Theory 10 (2004): 157–198.Google Scholar
  16. Greenberg, M., ‘A New Map of Theories of Mental Content: Constitutive Accounts and Normative Theories’, Philosophical Issues 15 (2005): 299–320.Google Scholar
  17. Greenberg, M., ‘The Standard Picture and Its Discontents’, Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law 1 (2011a).Google Scholar
  18. Greenberg, M., ‘Legislation as Communication? Legal Interpretation and the Study of Linguistic Communication.’ In Marmor, A., and Soames, S. (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of Language in the Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011b).Google Scholar
  19. Greenberg, M., ‘Naturalism in Epistemology and the Philosophy of Law’, (Naturalism I), Law and Philosophy 30 (2011c): 419–451.Google Scholar
  20. Greenberg, M., ‘Beyond the Standard Picture’, Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law 3 (forthcoming).Google Scholar
  21. Hershovitz, S., Exploring Law’s Empire: The Jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).Google Scholar
  22. Johnsen, B., ‘How to Read ‘Epistemology Naturalized’’, Journal of Philosophy 102 (2005): 78–93.Google Scholar
  23. Kim, J., ‘What Is ‘Naturalized Epistemology’?’ In Kornblith, H. (ed.), Naturalizing Epistemology (2nd ed.) (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994).Google Scholar
  24. Knapp, S., and Michaels, W., ‘Against Theory’, Critical Inquiry 8 (1982): 723–742.Google Scholar
  25. Knapp, S., and Michaels, W., ‘A Reply to Our Critics’, Critical Inquiry 9 (1983): 790–800.Google Scholar
  26. Knapp, S., and Michaels, W., ‘Not a Matter of Interpretation’, San Diego Law Review 42 (2005): 651–668.Google Scholar
  27. Kornblith, H. (ed.), Naturalizing Epistemology (2nd ed.) (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994).Google Scholar
  28. Leiter, B., ‘Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence’, Texas Law Review 76 (1997): 267–315.Google Scholar
  29. Leiter, B., ‘Naturalism and Naturalized Jurisprudence.’ In Bix Brian (ed.), Analyzing Law: New Essays in Legal Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).Google Scholar
  30. Leiter, B., ‘Legal Realism and Legal Positivism Reconsidered’, Ethics 111 (2001): 278–301.Google Scholar
  31. Leiter, B., Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal Realism and Naturalism in Legal Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007a).Google Scholar
  32. Leiter, B., ‘Explaining Theoretical Disagreement’ (August 3, 2007). University of Texas, Austin School of Law Public Law Research Paper No. 124 (2007b). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1004768.
  33. Marmor, A., ‘The Pragmatics of Legal Language’, Ratio Juris 21 (2008): 423–452.Google Scholar
  34. Marmor, A., ‘Can the Law Imply More Than It Says? – On Some Pragmatic Aspects of Strategic Speech.’ In Marmor, A., and Soames, S. (eds.), Foundations of Language and the Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).Google Scholar
  35. Marmor, A., and Soames, S. (eds.), Foundations of Language and the Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).Google Scholar
  36. Neale, S., ‘The Intentionalism of Textualism’, http://lawold.usc.edu/academics/centers/clp/papers/documents/Neale.pdf (2009).
  37. Putnam, H., ‘Why Reason Can’t Be Naturalized.’ In Putnam, H. (ed.), Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers 3 (1983): 229–247.Google Scholar
  38. Quine, W. V. O., Epistemology Naturalized in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969).Google Scholar
  39. Quine, W. V. O., The Pursuit of Truth (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).Google Scholar
  40. Quine, W. V. O., and Ullian, J., The Web of Belief (2nd ed.). (New York: Random House, 1978).Google Scholar
  41. Raz, J., Between Authority and Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).Google Scholar
  42. Shapiro, S., Legality (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010).Google Scholar
  43. Soames, S., ‘Interpreting Legal Texts: What is, and What is Not, Special About the Law.’ In Soames, S. (ed.), Philosophical Essays, Volume I: Natural Language: What It Means & How We Use It (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy and School of LawUCLALos AngelesUSA

Personalised recommendations