Journal of Mathematical Sciences

, Volume 140, Issue 6, pp 796–807 | Cite as

Nash equilibrium in multi-player games with the choice of time instants and integral cost functionals

  • S. A. Brykalov
  • O. N. Golovina
  • A. V. Kryazhimskii


We consider the multi-player game in which each of the players chooses a positive number meaning a time instant. The cost functions involve improper integrals with infinite upper limit. The authors obtain necessary conditions for the strategy of a player to be the best response to the strategies of other players and also sufficient conditions for the existence of the best response. Using these results, the authors formulate conditions for a tuple of strategies to be a Nash equilibrium. The result on the reduction of the initial game to a game in which each of the players has finitely many strategies is presented. For a game with certain symmetry properties, the authors give a complete description of the set of Nash equilibrium points. Algorithms for finding best responses and Nash equilibria in the initial game are presented. The algorithms consist of a finite number of item-by-item examinations.


Nash Equilibrium NASH Time Instant Nash Equilibrium Point Symmetric Game 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • S. A. Brykalov
  • O. N. Golovina
  • A. V. Kryazhimskii

There are no affiliations available

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