Research and Development with Stock-Dependent Spillovers and Price Competition in a Duopoly

  • Fouad El OuardighiEmail author
  • Matan Shnaiderman
  • Federico Pasin


This paper investigates the research and development accumulation and pricing strategies of two firms competing for consumer demand in a dynamic framework. A firm’s research and development is production-cost-reducing and can benefit from part of the competitor’s research and development stock without payment. We consider decisions in a game characterized by Nash equilibrium. In this dynamic game, a player’s action depends on whether the competitor’s current research and development stock are observable. If the competitor’s current research and development stock are not observable or observable only after a certain time lag, a player’s action can be solely based on the information on the current period t (open-loop strategy). In the converse case, it can also include the information on the competitor’s reaction to a change in the current value of the state vector (closed-loop strategy), which allows for strategic interaction to take place throughout the game. Given the cumulative nature of research and development activities, a primary goal of this paper is to determine whether, regardless of the observability of the competitor’s current research and development stock, free research and development spillovers generate a lower level of scientific knowledge than research and development appropriability. A second objective of the paper is to determine how the observability of the rival’s current research and development stock affects a firm’s research and development and pricing decisions and payoffs under imperfect research and development appropriability.


Research and development competition Research and development spillovers Price competition Duopoly market 



The authors are grateful to Gary Erickson and Steffen Jørgensen for constructive suggestions on an early draft. The paper was written while the first author was visiting the Department of Logistics and Operations Management at HEC-Montreal in Canada.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Fouad El Ouardighi
    • 1
    Email author
  • Matan Shnaiderman
    • 2
  • Federico Pasin
    • 3
  1. 1.ESSEC Business SchoolCergy PontoiseFrance
  2. 2.Bar-Ilan UniversityRamat-GanIsrael
  3. 3.HEC MontréalMontréalCanada

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