The Myerson Value and Superfluous Supports in Union Stable Systems
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In this paper, the set of feasible coalitions in a cooperative game is given by a union stable system. Well-known examples of such systems are communication situations and permission structures. Two games associated with a game on a union stable system are the restricted game (on the set of players in the game) and the conference game (on the set of supports of the system). We define two types of superfluous support property through these two games and provide new characterizations for the Myerson value. Finally, we analyze inheritance of properties between the restricted game and the conference game.
KeywordsUnion stable system Myerson value Superfluous support property Restricted game Conference game
This research was finished while the first author was visiting Tinbergen Institute and VU University Amsterdam, under grant Ref. 24022011 of Seville University. Also, this visit was partially supported by Tinbergen Institute. Moreover, this work was presented in some conferences under financial support of the project ECO201017766.
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