Journal of Network and Systems Management

, Volume 20, Issue 4, pp 561–578 | Cite as

Online Randomization Strategies to Obfuscate User Behavioral Patterns

  • Juan E. Tapiador
  • Julio C. Hernandez-Castro
  • Pedro Peris-Lopez
Article

Abstract

When operating from the cloud, traces of user activities and behavioral patterns are accessible to anyone with enough privileges within the system. This could be, for example, the case of dishonest technical staff who may well be interested in selling user logs to competitors. In this paper, we investigate some of the security and privacy leakages derived from the analysis of user activities. We show that the working behavioral patterns exhibited by users can be easily captured into computationally useful representations that would allow an adversary to predict future activities, detect the occurrence of events of interest, or infer the organization’s internal structure. We then introduce the idea of obfuscating user behaviour through Online Action Randomization Algorithms. In doing so, we introduce an indistinguishability-based definition for perfectly obfuscated actions and a concrete scheme to randomize user traces in an incremental way. We report experimental results confirming the obfuscation quality and other properties of the proposed schemes.

Keywords

Cloud computing security Insider threats User modeling Anonymity Privacy 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Juan E. Tapiador
    • 1
    • 4
  • Julio C. Hernandez-Castro
    • 2
  • Pedro Peris-Lopez
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of YorkYorkUK
  2. 2.School of ComputingUniversity of PortsmouthPortsmouthUK
  3. 3.Information Security and Privacy LabDelft University of Technology (TU-Delft)DelftThe Netherlands
  4. 4.Deptartment of Computer ScienceUniversidad Carlos III de MadridLeganesSpain

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