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The Journal of Ethics

, Volume 23, Issue 4, pp 407–423 | Cite as

Strawson’s Method in ‘Freedom and Resentment’

  • Sybren HeyndelsEmail author
Article

Abstract

While P.F. Strawson’s essay ‘Freedom and Resentment’ has had many commentators, discussions of it can be roughly divided into two categories. A first group has dealt with the essay as something that stands by itself in order to analyse Strawson’s main arguments and to expose its weaknesses. A second group of commentators has looked beyond ‘Freedom and Resentment’ by emphasizing its Humean, Kantian or Wittgensteinian elements. Although both approaches have their own merits, it is too often forgotten that Strawson was an original thinker with his own views on the nature of philosophical problems and how to appropriately deal with them. The aim of this article is to remedy this forgetfulness and to make sense of ‘Freedom and Resentment’ from a Strawsonian perspective, by looking at Strawson’s own views on philosophical methodology.

Keywords

Strawson Moral responsibility Philosophical methodology Transcendental arguments Naturalism 

Notes

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.KU Leuven, Institute of PhilosophyLouvainBelgium

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