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The Journal of Ethics

, Volume 23, Issue 3, pp 241–255 | Cite as

The Free Will Debate and Basic Desert

  • Michael McKennaEmail author
Article

Abstract

A familiar claim in the free will debate is that the freedom in dispute between compatibilists and incompatibilists is limited to the type required for an agent to deserve blame for moral wrongdoing, and to deserve it in a sense that is basic. In this paper, I seek a rationale for this claim, offer an explanation of basic desert, and then argue that the free will debate can persist even when divorced from basic desert.

Keywords

Free will Moral responsibility Blame Desert 

Notes

Acknowledgements

For helpful comments, I would like to thank Dana Nelkin, Derk Pereboom, Carolina Sartorio, and Manuel Vargas.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of ArizonaTucsonUSA

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