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The Journal of Ethics

, Volume 23, Issue 3, pp 333–345 | Cite as

Pereboom’s Defense of Deliberation-Compatibilism: A Problem Remains

  • David WiderkerEmail author
Article

Abstract

Pereboom’s defense of deliberation-compatibilism is the most elaborate and most sophisticated current attempt to defend this position. In this paper, I have provided a careful, and open-minded assessment of that defense. The conclusion that emerged is that it is subject to an important objection that leaves him with no explanation of the relevant difference between a scenario in which it would irrational for an agent to deliberate what to do, and a scenario the deliberation-compatibilist would consider appropriate for rational deliberation. Without a satisfactory response to this objection, Pereboom’s defense of deliberation-compatibilism cannot be deemed successful.

Keywords

Free will Free will skepticism Deliberation-compatibilism Deliberationincompatibilism Determinism Rational deliberation Pereboom Nelkin Kapitan Searle van Inwagen 

Notes

References

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyBar-Ilan UniversityRamat-GanIsrael

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