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The Journal of Ethics

, Volume 20, Issue 1–3, pp 191–218 | Cite as

Luck’s Extended Reach

  • Ishtiyaque Haji
Article

Abstract

Something is a matter of luck if it is beyond our control. In this paper, I argue for the primary thesis that luck can undermine varieties of obligation, such as moral and prudential obligation, as well as judgments that are best from an agent’s own point of view. Among the considerations invoked to defend this thesis is a prevalent form of libertarianism, event-causal libertarianism. Arguments for the primary thesis that call on event-causal libertarianism raise concerns with this variety of libertarianism.

Keywords

Alternative possibilities Luck Modest libertarianism Moral responsibility Moral obligation 

Notes

Acknowledgments

This paper was written during my tenure of a 2015–2016 Calgary Institute for the Humanities (at the University of Calgary) grant. I am most grateful to this Institute for its support.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.CalgaryCanada

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