The Journal of Ethics

, Volume 20, Issue 4, pp 373–383

Abortion, Property, and Liberty


DOI: 10.1007/s10892-015-9201-x

Cite this article as:
Simkulet, W. J Ethics (2016) 20: 373. doi:10.1007/s10892-015-9201-x


In “Abortion and Ownership” John Martin Fischer argues that in Judith Jarvis Thomson’s violinist case you have a moral obligation not to unplug yourself from the violinist. Fischer comes to this conclusion by comparing the case with Joel Feinberg’s cabin case, in which he contends a stranger is justified in using your cabin to stay alive. I argue that the relevant difference between these cases is that while the stranger’s right to life trumps your right to property in the cabin case, the violinist’s right to life does not trump your right to liberty in the violinist case.


Abortion Cabin case Moral responsibility Moral luck Rape Restitution Rights Violinist case 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Cleveland State UniversityClevelandUSA

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