The Journal of Ethics

, Volume 18, Issue 4, pp 341–351 | Cite as

More on the Mirror: Reply to Fischer and Brueckner

Article

Abstract

John Martin Fischer and Anthony L. Brueckner have argued that a person’s death is, in many cases, bad for him, whereas a person’s prenatal non-existence is not bad for him. Their suggestion relies on the idea that death deprives the person of pleasant experiences that it is rational for him to care about, whereas prenatal non-existence only deprives him of pleasant experiences that it is not rational for him to care about. In two recent articles in The Journal of Ethics, I have objected that it is irrelevant what it is in fact rational for the person to care about. Fischer and Brueckner have replied to my critique. In this paper I respond to their latest pair of replies.

Keywords

Anthony L. Brueckner Deprivation approach Evil of death John Martin Fischer Prenatal non-existence 

Notes

Acknowledgments

Many thanks to Karl Ekendahl for helpful comments. Before I had finished this paper, Anthony Brueckner sadly passed away. While I never met him, I greatly admire his work and feel very privileged to have been involved in an exchange with him.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUppsala UniversityUppsalaSweden

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