Actual and Counterfactual Attitudes: Reply to Brueckner and Fischer
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In a recent article, I criticized Anthony L. Brueckner and John Martin Fischer’s influential argument—appealing to the rationality of our asymmetric attitudes towards past and future pleasures—against the Lucretian claim that death and prenatal non-existence are relevantly similar. Brueckner and Fischer have replied, however, that my critique involves an unjustified shift in temporal perspectives. In this paper, I respond to this charge and also argue that even if it were correct, it would fail to defend Brueckner and Fischer’s proposal against my critique.
KeywordsAnthony L. Brueckner Deprivation approach Evil of death John Martin Fischer Prenatal non-existence Symmetry argument
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