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The Journal of Ethics

, Volume 18, Issue 1, pp 11–18 | Cite as

Actual and Counterfactual Attitudes: Reply to Brueckner and Fischer

  • Jens Johansson
Article

Abstract

In a recent article, I criticized Anthony L. Brueckner and John Martin Fischer’s influential argument—appealing to the rationality of our asymmetric attitudes towards past and future pleasures—against the Lucretian claim that death and prenatal non-existence are relevantly similar. Brueckner and Fischer have replied, however, that my critique involves an unjustified shift in temporal perspectives. In this paper, I respond to this charge and also argue that even if it were correct, it would fail to defend Brueckner and Fischer’s proposal against my critique.

Keywords

Anthony L. Brueckner Deprivation approach Evil of death John Martin Fischer Prenatal non-existence Symmetry argument 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUppsala UniversityUppsalaSweden

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