Chairmen, Cocaine, and Car Crashes: The Knobe Effect as an Attribution Error
- 323 Downloads
In this paper, we argue that the so-called Knobe-Effect constitutes an error. There is now a wealth of data confirming that people are highly prone to what has also come to be known as the ‘side-effect effect’. That is, when attributing psychological states—such as intentionality, foreknowledge, and desiring—as well as other agential features—such as causal control—people typically do so to a greater extent when the action under consideration is evaluated negatively. There are a plethora of models attempting to account for this effect. We hold that the central question of interest is whether the effect represents a competence or an error in judgment. We offer a systematic argument for the claim that the burden of proof regarding this question is on the competence theorist. We sketch an account, based on the notion of the reactive attitudes, that can accommodate both the idea that these sorts of judgments are fundamentally normative and that they often constitute errors.
KeywordsMoral responsibility Intentionality Experimental philosophy Joshua Knobe
We would like to thank Pauline Kleingeld, Markus Schlosser, Frank Hindriks, Hichem Naar and audiences at Tilburg University, Eindhoven University, and at the Fourth Annual Dutch Conference in Practical Philosophy for helpful discussions. We are also grateful to two anonymous referees for comments. Research for this paper was funded by The Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO).
- Driver, J. 2008. Attributions of causation and moral responsibility. In Moral psychology, vol. 2, ed. W. Sinnott-Armstrong, 423–439. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
- Foot, P. 1967. The problem of abortion and the doctrine of double effect. Oxford Review 5: 5–15.Google Scholar
- Hindriks, F. (forthcoming). Normativity in action. How to explain the knobe effect and its relatives. Mind & Language. Google Scholar
- Kahneman, D., A. Tversky, et al. (eds.). 1982. Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
- Knobe, J., and B. Fraser. 2008. Causal judgment and moral judgment: Two experiments. In Moral psychology, ed. W. Sinnott-Armstrong, 441–448. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
- Nagel, T. 1993. Moral luck. In Moral luck, ed. D. Statman, 57–71. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press.Google Scholar
- Wallace, R.J. 1994. Responsibility and the moral sentiments. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
- Williams, B. 1985. Ethics and the limits of philosophy. London: Fontana.Google Scholar
- Young, L., F. Cushman, et al. 2006. Does emotion mediate the relationship between an action’s moral status and its intentional status? Neuropsychological evidence. Journal of Cognition and Culture 6(1–2): 265–278.Google Scholar