The Journal of Ethics

, Volume 17, Issue 1–2, pp 121–151 | Cite as

Still Better Never to Have Been: A Reply to (More of) My Critics



In Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence, I argued that coming into existence is always a harm and that procreation is wrong. In this paper, I respond to those of my critics to whom I have not previously responded. More specifically, I engage the objections of Tim Bayne, Ben Bradley, Campbell Brown, David DeGrazia, Elizabeth Harman, Chris Kaposy, Joseph Packer and Saul Smilansky.


Anti-natalism Betterness Procreation Quality of life Suicide Value 



I am grateful to Jens Johansson for very insightful and helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of Cape TownCape TownSouth Africa

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