A Rejoinder to Fischer and Tognazzini
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In Otsuka (1998), I endorse an incompatibilist Principle of Avoidable Blame. In this rejoinder to Fischer and Tognazzini (2009), I defend this principle against their charge that it is vulnerable to Frankfurt-type counterexample.
KeywordsFlicker of freedom Harry Frankfurt Frankfurt counterexample Free will Incompatibilism Moral responsibility Principle of Alternate Possibilities Principle of Avoidable Blame
I am very grateful to John Fischer and Neal Tognazzini for their challenging, illuminating, and lucid critique. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank John in print for leading me down the path to becoming a philosopher by providing me with such a compelling introduction to the subject when I was an undergraduate, and he an assistant professor, at Yale in the mid-eighties. I thank Kieran Setiya and Karin Boxer for discussion of this critique that has informed my rejoinder and Pete Graham for comments on this rejoinder.
- Fischer, J., and N. Tognazzini. 2009. Blame and avoidability: A reply to Otsuka. The Journal of Ethics 13. doi:10.1007/s10892-009-9056-0.