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The Journal of Ethics

, Volume 12, Issue 3–4, pp 287–306 | Cite as

A Compatibilist Account of the Epistemic Conditions on Rational Deliberation

  • Derk Pereboom
Article

Abstract

A traditional concern for determinists is that the epistemic conditions an agent must satisfy to deliberate about which of a number of distinct actions to perform threaten to conflict with a belief in determinism and its evident consequences. I develop an account of the sort that specifies two epistemic requirements, an epistemic openness condition and a belief in the efficacy of deliberation, whose upshot is that someone who believes in determinism and its evident consequences can deliberate without inconsistent beliefs. I argue that conditions of both types are indispensable, and that they can be formulated so as to withstand the relevant objections.

Keywords

Deliberation Determinism Incompatibilism Compatibilism Openness Deliberative efficacy 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Sage School of PhilosophyCornell UniversityIthacaUSA

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