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Journal of Combinatorial Optimization

, Volume 37, Issue 1, pp 330–336 | Cite as

Three-dimensional stable matching with hybrid preferences

  • Feng Zhang
  • Jing Li
  • Junxiang Fan
  • Huili Shen
  • Jian Shen
  • Hua YuEmail author
Article

Abstract

In this paper, we discuss the problem of stable matching with hybrid preferences among the three agent sets U, \(V_1\) and \(V_2\). We consider two hybrid preferences. One is that the agents of set U has a strict preference to the agents of set \(V_1 \times V_2\), and the agents of set \(V_1\) and \(V_2\) have a strict preference to the agents of set U respectively. The other is that the agents of set U has a strict preference to the agents of set \(V_1 \times V_2\), and the agents of set \(V_1 \times V_2\) has a strict preference to the agents of set U.

Keywords

Three-dimensional stable matching Hybrid preference Algorithm 

Notes

Acknowledgements

This research is supported by the Shanghai Science Committee of China under Grant Number 17495810503, and the Applied Mathematical Subject of SSPU under Grant Number XXKPY1604. We would like to express our heartfelt thanks.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Feng Zhang
    • 1
  • Jing Li
    • 2
  • Junxiang Fan
    • 2
  • Huili Shen
    • 2
  • Jian Shen
    • 2
  • Hua Yu
    • 2
    Email author
  1. 1.Shanghai Polytechnic UniversityShanghaiChina
  2. 2.Shanghai General Hospital, School of MedicineShanghai Jiaotong UniversityShanghaiChina

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