Three-dimensional stable matching with hybrid preferences
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In this paper, we discuss the problem of stable matching with hybrid preferences among the three agent sets U, \(V_1\) and \(V_2\). We consider two hybrid preferences. One is that the agents of set U has a strict preference to the agents of set \(V_1 \times V_2\), and the agents of set \(V_1\) and \(V_2\) have a strict preference to the agents of set U respectively. The other is that the agents of set U has a strict preference to the agents of set \(V_1 \times V_2\), and the agents of set \(V_1 \times V_2\) has a strict preference to the agents of set U.
KeywordsThree-dimensional stable matching Hybrid preference Algorithm
This research is supported by the Shanghai Science Committee of China under Grant Number 17495810503, and the Applied Mathematical Subject of SSPU under Grant Number XXKPY1604. We would like to express our heartfelt thanks.
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