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Journal of Combinatorial Optimization

, Volume 36, Issue 4, pp 1145–1167 | Cite as

Congestion games with mixed objectives

  • Matthias FeldottoEmail author
  • Lennart Leder
  • Alexander Skopalik
Article
  • 146 Downloads

Abstract

We study a new class of games which generalizes congestion games and its bottleneck variant. We introduce congestion games with mixed objectives to model network scenarios in which players seek to optimize for latency and bandwidths alike. We characterize the (non-)existence of pure Nash equilibria (PNE), the convergence of improvement dynamics, the quality of equilibria and show the complexity of the decision problem. For games that do not possess PNE we give bounds on the approximation ratio of approximate pure Nash equilibria.

Keywords

Congestion games Bottleneck congestion games Pure Nash equilibrium Existence Convergence Complexity Approximation 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Paderborn UniversityPaderbornGermany

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