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A History Based Logic for Dynamic Preference Updates

  • Can BaşkentEmail author
  • Guy McCusker
Article

Abstract

History based models suggest a process-based approach to epistemic and temporal reasoning. In this work, we introduce preferences to history based models. Motivated by game theoretical observations, we discuss how preferences can dynamically be updated in history based models. Following, we consider arrow update logic and event calculus, and give history based models for these logics. This allows us to relate dynamic logics of history based models to a broader framework.

Keywords

History based models Preference logic Dynamic logic Arrow update logic Product update models 

Notes

Acknowledgements

We acknowledge the input and feedback of David Pym and Gabriella Anderson for the early versions of this work. The work was carried out under the EPSRC project ALPUIS.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of BathBathUK
  2. 2.Institute for Ethical AIOxford Brookes UniversityOxfordEngland

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