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Inductive Reasoning in Social Choice Theory

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Abstract

The usual procedure in the theory of social choice consists in postulating some desirable properties which an aggregation procedure should verify and derive from them the features of a corresponding social choice function and the outcomes that arise at each possible profile of preferences. In this paper we invert this line of reasoning and try to infer, up from what we call social situations (each one consisting of a profile and the associated social ordering) the criteria verified in the implicit aggregation procedure. This inference process, which extracts intensional from extensional information can be seen as an exercise in “qualitative statistics”.

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Notes

  1. A related distinction, between criteria and axioms, is developed by Campbell and Kelly (1997).

  2. See Hurwicz (1960), Mount and Reiter (1974), Reiter (1977), Reichelstein and Reiter (1988) and Hurwicz and Reiter (2001), among others.

  3. A textbook example involves an environment consisting of the preferences of the agents about a public good (for instance whether to build or not a bridge, or to install or not a park in the neighborhood, etc.) and their willingness to pay for it. The social outcome will be the decision of allocate or not resources to the public good and how much to extract from each agent to cover the costs.

  4. Notice that we could also apply anonymity, i.e. independence of the names of the agents. But then, for instance, all dictatorial rules would become identified, critically reducing the number of aggregation procedures that our inductive method is able to characterize.

  5. Notice that \(\bar{R} = \{\{b \prec c\}, \{a\}\}\) and \(\bar{R}^{\prime } = \{\{a \prec c\}, \{b\}\}\). This means that these social orders are not complete. In the former case only b and c can be compared, while a is not preferred (nor indifferent) to the other two alternatives. In the case of \(\bar{R}^{\prime }\) the comparable alternatives are a and c, while b remains unrelated to them.

  6. The proofs of the claims can be found in the Appendix.

  7. In more technical terms this means that for each \({\mathcal {S}} \in \bar{\mathcal {S}}\) there exist a permutation \(\gamma \), such that \({\mathcal {F}}_{{\mathcal {G}}_{S}}(\bar{\mathcal {S}})\) is equivalent modulo\(\gamma \) to the class of decision sets of \({\mathcal {S}}\).

  8. Notice that, on one hand, \({\mathbf {f}}(\hbox {prof}_{\mathcal {S}})\) may not necessarily coincide with the social relation \(\bar{R}\) in the situation \({\mathcal {S}}\). On the other hand, there might exist at least two elements \(s, t \in S\) such that \({\mathbf {f}}(\hbox {prof}_{\mathcal {S}})(s,t)= \emptyset \).

  9. \(\lceil r \rceil \) is the least upper integer bound of r.

  10. That is, \({\mathcal {DEC}}({\mathbf {f}}) = \cup _{j}\{\{{\mathcal {D}}(s,t)\}_{s,t \in S^j}\}^{j}\).

  11. We will omit the subscript \({\mathcal {G}}_{S}\), except when necessary.

  12. In the case in which each hyperedge has a cardinality of 2 and dropping the labels we obtain the notion of graph as a particular case.

  13. Notice that the literature always assumes as given the main properties and even the functional form of the social welfare function and then derives its structure of decisive sets to find the implicit power structure. Here instead, we start from nothing else than the social situations and find those structures up from the equivalence among situations.

  14. For a general treatment of first-order logic see Smullyan (1995).

  15. This is why in Example 7, \(\phi ^{1}\) and \(\phi ^{-1^{'}}\) are not inconsistent: there exist a model where they are both true. In that model the social order is indifferent between any pair of alternatives.

  16. We will restrict the meaning of \({\mathcal {A}}^{{\mathbf {f}}}\) to be the non-logical axioms of \({\mathcal {T}}^{{\mathbf {f}}}\). The logical axioms are those of first-order logic.

  17. Notice that this sentence is still first order, since the quantifiers do not range over propositional (i.e. truth-valued) functions.

  18. They capture the features of voting rules, which are completely described by \({\mathcal {H}}({\mathbf {f}})\), as indicated in Proposition 5.

  19. Notice that this non-dictatorship condition can be rewritten as to become the claim of the existence of a pair of alternatives which for every individual and every profile verify that the social outcome differs from the individual orderings.

  20. See Kirman and Sondermann (1972), Brown (1974) or Hansson (1976).

  21. In fact, nothing in the theorem ensures that the axiomatization will be finite.

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Appendix

Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1

It is immediate from the definition of \(\simeq _{{\mathcal {D}}({\mathcal {G}}_{S})}\) that for any situation \({\mathcal {S}}\), \({\mathcal {S}} \simeq _{{\mathcal {D}}({\mathcal {G}}_{S})}{\mathcal {S}}\), just taking the identity permutation \(Id_S\), which belongs to \({\mathcal {G}}_{S}\) by (A2). That is, \(\simeq _{{\mathcal {D}}({\mathcal {G}}_{S})}\) is reflexive. To see that it is symmetric, assume \({\mathcal {S}} \simeq _{{\mathcal {D}}({\mathcal {G}}_{S})}{\mathcal {S}^{'}}\) under a \(\gamma \in {\mathcal {G}}_{S}\). Then, by (A3), \(\gamma ^{-1} \in {\mathcal {G}}_{S}\), and thus \({\mathcal {S}}^{'} \simeq _{{\mathcal {D}}({\mathcal {G}}_{S})}{\mathcal {S}}\). On the other hand, when \({\mathcal {S}} \simeq _{{\mathcal {D}}({\mathcal {G}}_{S})}{\mathcal {S}^{'}}\) and \({\mathcal {S}}^{'} \simeq _{{\mathcal {D}}({\mathcal {G}}_{S})}{\mathcal {S}^{''}}\) we have that there exist permutations \(\gamma , \gamma ^{'} \in {\mathcal {G}}_{S}\) such that for each \(s,t \in S\)

$$\begin{aligned}&D^{{\mathcal {S}}}(\{s,t\})=D^{{\mathcal {S}}^{'}}(\{\gamma (s),\gamma (t)\}) \ \hbox {and} \\&\quad \ D^{{\mathcal {S}}^{'}}(\{\gamma (s),\gamma (t)\}) \ = \ D^{{\mathcal {S}}^{''}}(\{\gamma ^{'} \circ \gamma (s),\gamma ^{'} \circ \gamma (t)\}) \end{aligned}$$

That is

$$\begin{aligned} D^{{\mathcal {S}}}(\{s,t\}) \ = \ D^{{\mathcal {S}}^{''}}(\{\gamma ^{'} \circ \gamma (s),\gamma ^{'} \circ \gamma (t)\}) \end{aligned}$$

Since, by (A1) \(\gamma ^{'} \circ \gamma \in {\mathcal {G}}_{S}\), \({\mathcal {S}} \simeq _{{\mathcal {D}}({\mathcal {G}}_{S})}{\mathcal {S}^{''}}\). That is, \(\simeq _{{\mathcal {D}}({\mathcal {G}}_{S})}\) is transitive. \(\square \)

Proof of Theorem 1

\(\Rightarrow )\) Given \(\bar{\mathcal {S}} \in \widehat{\mathcal {S}}/\simeq _{{\mathcal {D}}({\mathcal {G}}_{S})}\) consider the family of its decision sets, \({\mathcal {F}}_{{\mathcal {G}}_{S}}(\bar{\mathcal {S}})\) and define a function \({\mathbf {f}}_{\bar{\mathcal {S}}}\) as follows. For each profile \(\langle R_{1},\ldots , R_{n}\rangle \) and for each pair \(s,t \in S\), consider the decisive set \(D(\{s,t\})\in {\mathcal {F}}_{{\mathcal {G}}_{S}}(\bar{\mathcal {S}})\). Then, for every \(\gamma \in {\mathcal {G}}_{S}\):

$$\begin{aligned} {\mathbf {f}}\big (\hbox {prof}_{\gamma ({\mathcal {S}})}\big ) = R(\gamma (s),\gamma (t)) \ \hbox {iff for every} \ i \in D(\{s,t\}), R_{i}(\gamma (s),\gamma (t)). \end{aligned}$$

By the definition of \({\mathcal {F}}_{{\mathcal {G}}_{S}}(\bar{\mathcal {S}})\), \({\mathbf {f}}_{\bar{\mathcal {S}}} \in \mathbf{F}_{{\mathcal {G}}_{S}}\). Moreover, if for every \({\mathcal {S}}=\langle S, R_{1}, \ldots , R_{n};{\bar{R}}\rangle \notin \bar{\mathcal {S}}\) we define \({\mathbf {f}}_{\bar{\mathcal {S}}}\big (R_{1},\ldots ,R_{n}\big )= \emptyset \), it is immediate that \({\mathbf {f}}_{\bar{\mathcal {S}}}\) is prime.

\(\Leftarrow )\) Consider the class of situations with nonempty social orders which can be seen as defined by an arbitrary prime aggregation function \({\mathbf {f}} \in \mathbf{F}_{{\mathcal {G}}_{S}}\), \(\widehat{\mathcal {S}}^{{\mathbf {f}}}=\{{\mathcal {S}} \in \widehat{\mathcal {S}}: {\mathcal {S}}= \langle S, R_{1}, \ldots , R_{n};{\bar{R}}\rangle , {\mathbf {f}}(R_{1},\ldots ,R_{n})= {\bar{R}} \ne \emptyset \}\). Assume, by way of contradiction, that there exist two equivalence classes \(\bar{\mathcal {S}}, \bar{\mathcal {S}}^{'} \in \widehat{\mathcal {S}}/\simeq _{{\mathcal {D}}({\mathcal {G}}_{S})}\) such that \(\widehat{\mathcal {S}}^{{\mathbf {f}}}\cap \bar{\mathcal {S}} \ne \emptyset \) and \(\widehat{\mathcal {S}}^{{\mathbf {f}}}\cap \bar{\mathcal {S}}^{'} \ne \emptyset \). Consider two situations \({\mathcal {S}} \in \widehat{\mathcal {S}}^{{\mathbf {f}}}\cap \bar{\mathcal {S}}\) and \({\mathcal {S}}^{'} \in \widehat{\mathcal {S}}^{{\mathbf {f}}}\cap \bar{\mathcal {S}}^{'}\). Then, \({\mathcal {S}}\) and \({\mathcal {S}}^{'}\) are not equivalent. This can happens for two reasons: for every permutations \(\gamma \) there exists at least a pair \(s,t \in S\) such that either

  • \(D^{\bar{\mathcal {S}}}(\{s,t\})\ne \big (D^{\bar{\mathcal {S}}^{'}}(\{\gamma ^{-1}(s),\gamma ^{-1}(t)\})\big )\)

or

  • either \({\bar{R}}(s,t)\) or \({\bar{R}}^{'}(\gamma (s),\gamma (t))\) is not defined.

Let us analyze the latter case. Without loss of generality, assume that \({\mathcal {S}}=\langle S, R_{1}, \ldots , R_{n};{\bar{R}}\rangle \) and \({\mathcal {S}}^{'}=\langle S, R_{1}^{'}, \ldots , R_{n}^{'};{\bar{R}}^{'}\rangle \) are such that \(R_{i}\equiv R_{i}^{'}\) for \(i=1,\ldots ,n\) while \({\bar{R}}(s,t)\) and not \({\bar{R}}^{'}(\gamma (s),\gamma (t))\) (nor \({\bar{R}}^{'}(\gamma (t),\gamma (s))\)), in particular for \(\gamma \equiv Id_S\). Since \({\mathcal {S}}, {\mathcal {S}}^{'} \in \widehat{\mathcal {S}}^{{\mathbf {f}}}\), \( {\bar{R}}={\mathbf {f}}(R_{1},\ldots ,R_{n})\) and \( {\bar{R}}^{'}={\mathbf {f}}(R_{1},\ldots ,R_{n})\). But then, since we assumed that \({\bar{R}} \not \equiv {\bar{R}}^{'}\) we have a contradiction because \({\mathbf {f}}\) is assumed to be a function.

Now suppose that \(D^{\bar{\mathcal {S}}}(\{s,t\})\ne D^{\bar{\mathcal {S}}^{'}}(\{\gamma ^{-1}(s),\gamma ^{-1}(t)\})\) for at least a pair of alternatives, s and t. According to the \(\Rightarrow \) part of this proof there exist two prime aggregation functions \({\mathbf {f}}^{'}\) and \({\mathbf {f}}^{''}\) in \(\mathbf{F}_{{\mathcal {G}}_{S}}\) such that \({\mathbf {f}}^{'}(R_{1},\ldots ,R_{n})= {\bar{R}}\) and \({\mathbf {f}}^{''}(R_{1},\ldots ,R_{n})= {\bar{R}}^{'}\). On the other hand we have that \({\mathbf {f}}^{'}(R_{1},\ldots ,R_{n})\subseteq {\mathbf {f}}(R_{1},\ldots ,R_{n})\) and \({\mathbf {f}}^{''}(R_{1},\ldots ,R_{n})\subseteq {\mathbf {f}}(R_{1},\ldots ,R_{n})\), but this is absurd since \({\mathbf {f}}\) is prime. This shows that there exists an equivalence class \(\bar{\mathcal {S}}\in \widehat{\mathcal {S}}/\simeq _{{\mathcal {D}}({\mathcal {G}}_{S})}\), such that \(\widehat{\mathcal {S}}^{{\mathbf {f}}}\subseteq \bar{\mathcal {S}}\).

Now assume that there exists a situation \({\mathcal {S}} \in \bar{\mathcal {S}}\) and \({\mathcal {S}} \notin \widehat{\mathcal {S}}^{{\mathbf {f}}}\). This means that if \({\mathcal {S}}\) is \(\langle S, R_{1}, \ldots , R_{n};{\bar{R}}\rangle \), with \({\bar{R}} \not \equiv {\mathbf {f}}(R_{1},\ldots ,R_{n})\), there must exist a situation \({\mathcal {S}}^{'}= \langle S, R_{1}, \ldots , R_{n};{\mathbf {f}}(R_{1},\ldots ,R_{n})\rangle \in \widehat{\mathcal {S}}^{{\mathbf {f}}}\). But then, for every permutation \(\gamma \), there must exist at least a pair \(s,t \in S\) such that \(D^{{\mathcal {S}}}(\{s,t\})\ne D^{{\mathcal {S}}^{'}}(\{\gamma ^{-1}(s),\gamma ^{-1}(t)\})\). Absurd, since \({\mathcal {S}}\) and \({\mathcal {S}}^{'}\) are both in \(\bar{\mathcal {S}}\). Therefore \(\widehat{\mathcal {S}}^{{\mathbf {f}}}=\bar{\mathcal {S}}\). \(\square \)

Proof of Proposition 2

For every aggregation function \({\mathbf {f}}\) there exists a family \(\{{\mathbf {f}}^{j}\}_{j \in J_{-0}}\) of prime aggregation functions such that each \({\mathbf {f}}^{j} \preceq {\mathbf {f}}\). Consider each \({\bar{R}} \in \hbox {Im}\big ({\mathbf {f}}\big )\). If \({\bar{R}} \ne \emptyset \) just consider the equivalence classes associated to each prime function according to Theorem 1: \(\{\bar{\mathcal {S}}^{j}\}_{j \in J_{-0}} \subseteq \widehat{\mathcal {S}}/\simeq _{{\mathcal {D}}({\mathcal {G}}_{S})}\). It is clear that for each \(\hbox {prof}_{\mathcal {S}}\) such that \({\mathcal {S}} \in \cup _{j \in J_{-0}}\bar{\mathcal {S}}^{j}\) we have that there exists at least a \(j \in J_{-0}\) that verifies that \({\mathbf {f}}^{j}(\hbox {prof}_{\mathcal {S}})= {\bar{R}}\). On the other hand, if \(R=\emptyset \) then consider \(\bar{\mathcal {S}}^{0}\) the class of all the situations of the form \(\langle S, R_{1},\ldots , R_{n}; \emptyset \rangle \). This class corresponds to the prime function \({\mathbf {f}}^{0}\) such that \({\mathbf {f}}^{0}(\hbox {prof}_{\mathcal {S}})= \emptyset \). Then, if we consider the class \(J=J_{-0}\cup \{0\}\), we have that \({\mathbf {f}}(\hbox {prof}_{\mathcal {S}})= {\bar{R}}\) for every \({\mathcal {S}} \in \cup _{j \in J}\bar{\mathcal {S}}^{j}\). \(\square \)

Proof of Theorem 2

First of all, let us note that each chain \({\mathcal {C}}\) in \(\langle \langle \mathbf{F}_{{\mathcal {G}}_{S}}, \preceq \rangle \) has a length, defined as its cardinality and denoted as \(|{\mathcal {C}}|\). Consider first the case in which \(|{\mathcal {C}}| \le \aleph _{0}\), i.e. that \({\mathcal {C}}\) is countable. If \({\mathcal {C}} = \langle {\mathbf {f}}^{0}, {\mathbf {f}}^{1}, \ldots , {\mathbf {f}}^{|{\mathcal {C}}|}\rangle \), \({\mathbf {f}}^{0}\) is the only prime aggregation function in \({\mathcal {C}}\). According to Theorem 1, for \({\mathbf {f}}^{0}\) there exists a \(\bar{\mathcal {S}}^{0} \in \widehat{\mathcal {S}}/\simeq _{{\mathcal {D}}({\mathcal {G}}_{S})}\) such that \({\mathbf {f}}^{0}(\hbox {prof}({\mathcal {S}}))= {\bar{R}}\) for every \({\mathcal {S}}= \langle S, R_{1},\ldots , R_{n}; {\bar{R}}\rangle \in \bar{\mathcal {S}}^{0}\). We will prove by induction that for each \({\mathbf {f}}^{k} \in {\mathcal {C}}\) there exists an element \(\pi ^{k}\) in a partition \(\Pi ^{\alpha ^{k}}\) such that \({\mathbf {f}}^{k}(\hbox {prof}({\mathcal {S}}))= {\bar{R}}\) for every \({\mathcal {S}}= \langle S, R_{1},\ldots , R_{n}; {\bar{R}}\rangle \in \pi ^{k}\). Moreover, that \(\Pi ^{\alpha ^{k}}\) is a refinement of \(\Pi ^{\alpha ^{k+1}}\) for each k:

  • Consider the case of \({\mathbf {f}}^{1}\). According to Proposition 2 we have that there exists \(\{\bar{\mathcal {S}}^{j}\}_{j \in J} \subseteq \widehat{\mathcal {S}}/\simeq _{{\mathcal {D}}({\mathcal {G}}_{S})}\) such that \({\mathbf {f}}(\hbox {prof}_{\mathcal {S}})= {\bar{R}}\) for every \({\mathcal {S}}= \langle S, \hbox {prof}_{\mathcal {S}}; {\bar{R}}\rangle \in \cup _{j \in J}\bar{\mathcal {S}}^{j}\). Suppose that \(\bar{\mathcal {S}}^{0} \ne \bar{\mathcal {S}}^{j}\) for every \(j \in J\), but then this means that \({\mathbf {f}}^{0}(\hbox {prof}_{\mathcal {S}})\ne {\mathbf {f}}^{1}(\hbox {prof}_{\mathcal {S}})\) for every \({\mathcal {S}}\in \bar{\mathcal {S}}^{0}\). Absurd, since we assumed that \({\mathbf {f}}^{0}\preceq {\mathbf {f}}^{1}\). Then \(\bar{\mathcal {S}}^{0} \in \{\bar{\mathcal {S}}^{j}\}_{j \in J}\). That is, while \({\mathbf {f}}^{0}\) is supported by \(\bar{\mathcal {S}}^{0} \in \widehat{\mathcal {S}}/\simeq _{{\mathcal {D}}({\mathcal {G}}_{S})}\), \({\mathbf {f}}^{1}\) is supported by \(\bar{\mathcal {S}}^{0} \cup _{j\in J,j\ne 0}\bar{\mathcal {S}}^{j}\). If we call \(\bar{\mathcal {S}}^{0}\), \(\pi ^{0}\) and \(\widehat{\mathcal {S}}/\simeq _{{\mathcal {D}}({\mathcal {G}}_{S})}\), \(\Pi ^{\alpha _{0}}\), we see that if we denote \(\bar{\mathcal {S}}^{0} \cup _{j\in J,j\ne 0}\bar{\mathcal {S}}^{j}\) as \(\pi ^{1}\), it is clear that \(\pi _{0} \subseteq \pi _{1}\). On the other hand, \(\pi _{1}\cup _{j^{'} \notin J}\bar{\mathcal {S}}^{j^{'}}= \widehat{\mathcal {S}}\) while \(\pi _{1}\cap \bar{\mathcal {S}}^{j^{'}}= \emptyset \) for every \(j^{'} \notin J\). That means that \(\pi _{1}\) and \(\{\bar{\mathcal {S}}^{j^{'}}\}_{j^{'} \notin J}\) constitute a partition of \(\widehat{\mathcal {S}}\), which we call \(\Pi ^{\alpha _{1}}\). Since for \(\pi ^{0} \in \Pi ^{\alpha ^{0}}\), \(\pi ^{0}\subseteq \pi ^{1}\) and for each \(\bar{\mathcal {S}}^{j}\in \Pi ^{\alpha ^{0}}\) (\(j \in J\)), \(\bar{\mathcal {S}}^{j}\subseteq \pi ^{1}\) while \(\bar{\mathcal {S}}^{j^{'}}\in \Pi ^{\alpha ^{1}}\) for \(j^{'} \notin J\), \(\Pi ^{\alpha ^{1}}\) is a coarsening of \(\Pi ^{\alpha ^{0}}\).

  • Assume that the result is valid up to k. That is, \({\mathbf {f}}^{k}\) is supported by a \(\pi ^{k} \in \Pi ^{\alpha ^{k}}\). Without loss of generality we assume that if \({\mathbf {f}}^{k}\) is supported, according to Proposition 2, by a family \(\{\bar{\mathcal {S}}^{l}\}_{l \in L} \subseteq \widehat{\mathcal {S}}/\simeq _{{\mathcal {D}}( {\mathcal {G}}_{S})}\) then \(\pi ^{k}= \cup _{l \in L}\bar{\mathcal {S}}^{l}\) and \(\Pi ^{\alpha ^{k}}=\{\pi ^{k}, \{\bar{\mathcal {S}}^{l^{'}}\}_{l^{'} \notin L}\}\). Now consider the case of \({\mathbf {f}}^{k+1}\). Again, by Proposition 2, we have that there exists \(\{\bar{\mathcal {S}}^{j}\}_{j \in J} \subseteq \widehat{\mathcal {S}}/\simeq _{{\mathcal {D}}({\mathcal {G}}_{n}, {\mathcal {G}}_{S})}\) such that \({\mathbf {f}}^{k+1}(\hbox {prof}_{\mathcal {S}})= {\bar{R}}\) for every \({\mathcal {S}} \in \cup _{j \in J}\bar{\mathcal {S}}^{j}\). Since \({\mathbf {f}}^{k}\preceq {\mathbf {f}}^{k+1}\) we have that \({\mathbf {f}}^{k}(\hbox {prof}_{\mathcal {S}})\subseteq {\mathbf {f}}^{k+1}(\hbox {prof}_{\mathcal {S}})\) for every \({\mathcal {S}} \in \pi ^{k}\). That is, \(\pi ^{k} \in \{\bar{\mathcal {S}}^{j}\}_{j \in J}\). Let us call the latter \(\pi ^{k+1}\). We have that \(\pi ^{k+1}\) and \(\{\bar{\mathcal {S}}^{j^{'}}\}_{j^{'} \notin J}\) is a partition of \(\widehat{\mathcal {S}}\) which we call \(\Pi ^{\alpha ^{k+1}}\). It is clear that \(\pi ^{k} \subseteq \pi ^{k+1}\) and \(\bar{\mathcal {S}}^{j} \subseteq \pi ^{k+1}\) for \(j \in J\), while \(\bar{\mathcal {S}}^{j^{'}}\in \Pi ^{\alpha ^{k+1}}\) for \(j^{'} \notin J\). Therefore, \(\Pi ^{\alpha ^{k+1}}\) is a coarsening of \(\Pi ^{\alpha ^{k}}\).

Therefore, the claim is proved for every k.

Now consider the case in which \(|{\mathcal {C}}| > \aleph _{0}\). Then, the set of indexes k in \({\mathcal {C}} = \langle {\mathbf {f}}^{0}, {\mathbf {f}}^{1}, \ldots , {\mathbf {f}}^{|{\mathcal {C}}|}\rangle \) can be decomposed in two classes, those of the functions with either successor or limit indexes. That is, those indexes \(k^{'}\) that have the form \(k^{'}=k+1\) (the successor indexes) and those which verify that \(k^{'}= lim_{k<k^{'}}k\), the limit indexes. The proof for the countable length of \({\mathcal {C}}\) applies also for the successor indexes. The following is the proof for the limit indexes:

  • Assume that the result is valid for each \(k<k^{'}\) for a limit index \(k^{'}\). That is, each \({\mathbf {f}}^{k}\) is supported by a \(\pi ^{k} \in \Pi ^{\alpha ^{k}}\) and, as \({\mathbf {f}}^{k}\) is supported by a family \(\{\bar{\mathcal {S}}^{l}\}_{l \in L} \subseteq \widehat{\mathcal {S}}/\simeq _{{\mathcal {D}}({\mathcal {G}}_{S})}\) then \(\pi ^{k}= \cup _{l \in L}\bar{\mathcal {S}}^{l}\) and \(\Pi ^{\alpha ^{k}}=\{\pi ^{k}, \{\bar{\mathcal {S}}^{l^{'}}\}_{l^{'} \notin L}\}\). Moreover, for each pair \(k_{1}< k_{2}<k^{'}\), \(\Pi ^{\alpha ^{k_{1}}}\) is a refinement of \(\Pi ^{\alpha ^{k_{2}}}\). Let us now consider \({\mathbf {f}}^{k^{'}}\). By Proposition 2 we have that there exists \(\{\bar{\mathcal {S}}^{j}\}_{j \in J} \subseteq \widehat{\mathcal {S}}/\simeq _{{\mathcal {D}}({\mathcal {G}}_{S})}\) such that \({\mathbf {f}}^{k^{'}}(\hbox {prof}_{\mathcal {S}})= {\bar{R}}\) for every \({\mathcal {S}} \in \cup _{j \in J}\bar{\mathcal {S}}^{j}\). For every \({\mathbf {f}}^{k}\preceq {\mathbf {f}}^{k+1}\) we have that \({\mathbf {f}}^{k}(\hbox {prof}_{\mathcal {S}})\subseteq {\mathbf {f}}^{k^{'}}(\hbox {prof}_{\mathcal {S}})\) for every \({\mathcal {S}} \in \pi ^{k}\). That is, each \(\pi ^{k} \in \{\bar{\mathcal {S}}^{j}\}_{j \in J}\). Let us call the latter \(\pi ^{k^{'}}\). We have that \(\pi ^{k^{'}}\) and \(\{\bar{\mathcal {S}}^{j^{'}}\}_{j^{'} \notin J}\) is a partition of \(\widehat{\mathcal {S}}\) which we call \(\Pi ^{\alpha ^{k^{'}}}\). It is clear that for each \(k<k^{'}\), \(\pi ^{k} \subseteq \pi ^{k^{'}}\) and \(\bar{\mathcal {S}}^{j} \subseteq \pi ^{k^{'}}\) for \(j \in J\), while \(\bar{\mathcal {S}}^{j^{'}}\in \Pi ^{\alpha ^{k^{'}}}\) for \(j^{'} \notin J\). Therefore, \(\Pi ^{\alpha ^{k^{'}}}\) is a coarsening of \(\{\Pi ^{\alpha ^{k}}\}_{k<k^{'}}\). \(\square \)

Proof of Proposition 3

According to Theorem 2, \({\mathcal {C}}\) generates a chain of partitions, and particularly of equivalence classes, a \(\pi ^{k}\) for each \({\mathbf {f}}^{k} \in {\mathcal {C}}\). Since each \(\pi ^{k}\) is fully described by \({\mathcal {DEC}}({\mathbf {f}}^{k})\), we have that \({\mathcal {C}}\) generates also a sequence of the form \({\mathcal {C}}^{{\mathcal {DEC}}}=\{{\mathcal {DEC}}({\mathbf {f}}^{k})\}_{k=0}^{|{\mathcal {C}}|}\). To see that \({\mathcal {C}}^{{\mathcal {DEC}}}\) is a chain under \(\subseteq \), just consider the fact that for \(k<k^{'}\), for every profile \(\hbox {prof}_{\mathcal {S}}\) we have that \({\mathbf {f}}^{k}\big (\hbox {prof}_{\mathcal {S}}\big ) \subseteq {\mathbf {f}}^{k^{'}}\big (\hbox {prof}_{\mathcal {S}}\big )\). Since, in particular \({\mathbf {f}}^{k}\big (\hbox {prof}_{\mathcal {S}}\big )(s,t) \subseteq {\mathbf {f}}^{k^{'}}\big (\hbox {prof}_{\mathcal {S}}\big )(s,t)\) for each situation \({\mathcal {S}}\) and every pair \(s,t \in S\), the class of agents that are decisive over s and t for the former function, \(D^{k}(\{s,t\}) \in {\mathcal {F}}^{k}_{{\mathcal {G}}_{S}}(\bar{\mathcal {S}})\subseteq {\mathcal {DEC}}({\mathbf {f}}^{k})\) is also a class of decisive agents over s and t for the latter. That is, \(D^{k}(\{s,t\}) \in {\mathcal {F}}^{k^{'}}_{{\mathcal {G}}_{S}}(\bar{\mathcal {S}})\subseteq {\mathcal {DEC}}({\mathbf {f}}^{k^{'}})\). In other words: \({\mathcal {DEC}}({\mathbf {f}}^{k}) \subseteq {\mathcal {DEC}}({\mathbf {f}}^{k^{'}})\). \(\square \)

Proof of Proposition 4

Trivial. Suppose \({\mathcal {S}}^{*}\in {\mathcal {SUPP}}({\mathbf {f}}^{j})\) for \(j < j^{*}\). Then, there would exist \({\mathcal {S}}^{'}\in {\mathcal {SUPP}}({\mathbf {f}}^{j^{*}})\), such that for a given pair \(s,t \in S\) and a permutation \(\gamma \), \(D^{{\mathcal {S}}^{*}}(\{s,t\})\subseteq \)\(D^{{\mathcal {S}}^{'}}(\{\gamma (s),\gamma (t)\})\). Then, either \(D^{{\mathcal {S}}^{*}}(\{s,t\})= \)\(D^{{\mathcal {S}}^{'}}(\{\gamma (s),\gamma (t)\})\) (in which case \({\mathcal {S}}^{*}\) is decision-equivalent to \({\mathcal {S}}^{'}\) and therefore \({\mathcal {S}}^{*} \in {\mathcal {SUPP}}({\mathbf {f}}^{j^{*}})\)) or \(D^{{\mathcal {S}}^{*}}(\{s,t\})\subset \)\(D^{{\mathcal {S}}^{'}}(\{\gamma (s),\gamma (t)\})\). But then, since \({\mathcal {DEC}}({\mathbf {f}}^{j}) \subseteq {\mathcal {DEC}}({\mathbf {f}}^{j^{*}})\), there will exist a decisive set for a pair s and t, \(D(\{s,t\})\in {\mathcal {DEC}}({\mathbf {f}}^{j^{*}})\) for which there does not exist a of permutation \(\gamma \) such that \(D^{{\mathcal {S}}^{*}}(\{s,t\})\subseteq \)\(D(\{\gamma (s),\gamma (t)\})\). Contradiction. \(\square \)

Proof of Proposition 7

By construction, each \(\theta \in \bigcup {\mathcal {H}}({\mathbf {f}})\) is \(\theta = \langle i, \mathcal {P}_{S}, \mathbf {G}_{n}, \mathbf {G}_{S} \rangle \), i.e. a single individual and a pair of states over which she is decisive(plus the permutations that preserve her decisiveness). Then \(\theta \in \mathbf {H}\) for a \(\mathbf {H} \in {\mathcal {H}}({\mathbf {f}})\). Define then \(\Upsilon (\theta )\) as the corresponding \(\mathbf {H}\). \(\square \)

Proof of Lemma 1

The first claim follows immediately from Definition 10 and Proposition 6. The characterization of the sentences in \({\mathcal {A}}^{{\mathbf {f}}}\) follows from the fact that sentences of the type \(\phi ^{\forall \forall }_{\mathbf {H}}\), \(\phi ^{\forall \exists }_{\mathbf {H}}\), \(\phi ^{\exists \forall }_{\mathbf {H}}\), \(\phi ^{\exists \exists }_{\mathbf {H}}\) or \(\phi ^{\triangle }\) can verified in \({\mathcal {H}}^{{\mathbf {f}}}\) independently of S and n being finite or not. \(\square \)

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Tohmé, F., Fioravanti, F. & Auday, M. Inductive Reasoning in Social Choice Theory. J of Log Lang and Inf 28, 551–575 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10849-019-09281-8

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