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Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade

, Volume 16, Issue 3, pp 297–308 | Cite as

Competition and Corporate Control in Partial Ownership Acquisitions

  • Torben StühmeierEmail author
Article

Abstract

Competition authorities have a growing interest in assessing the effects of partial ownership arrangements. We show that the effects of such agreements on competition and welfare depend on the intensity of competition in the market and on the firms’ governance structure. When assessing the effects of partial ownership, competition policy has to consider both the financial interest and level of control of the acquiring firm in the target firm.

Keywords

Corporate control Merger Partial acquisition 

JEL Classification

L11 L13 L41 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Universität Münster, Center for Applied Research in Economics MünsterMünsterGermany

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