Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade

, Volume 14, Issue 1, pp 83–98 | Cite as

Anti-Competitive Impact of Pseudo-Generics

  • Vasco Rodrigues
  • Ricardo Gonçalves
  • Hélder Vasconcelos


In pharmaceuticals markets, sellers of branded drugs sometimes sell generic versions of their own branded products, either directly or through license agreements. Although claims that these pseudo-generics may have anti-competitive effects are not unusual, the theoretical literature on this issue is limited and not conclusive. This paper uses a model that combines horizontal and vertical product differentiation, to explain how those effects may occur. We show that the producer of the branded product will not sell the pseudo-generic unless faced with competition and that, if she does so, in some circumstances, all prices rise to the benefit of all sellers and the detriment of consumers.


Pseudo-generics Product differentiation Pharmaceutical pricing 

JEL Classification

D43 L13 L44 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Vasco Rodrigues
    • 1
  • Ricardo Gonçalves
    • 1
  • Hélder Vasconcelos
    • 2
  1. 1.Centro de Estudos de Economia e Gestão, Faculdade de Economia e GestãoUniversidade Católica PortuguesaPortoPortugal
  2. 2.Faculdade de EconomiaUniversidade do PortoPortoPortugal

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