Market Share Delegation and Strategic Trade Policy

Article

Abstract

Strategic delegation analysis has been limited to sales delegation cases, until Jansen et al. (International Journal of Industrial Organization 25:531–539, 2007) presented the case of market share delegation. In international trade theory, export rivalry and import protection have always attracted considerable attention. This paper assesses the influence upon optimal trade policy of introducing market share delegation in a trade duopoly context. It shows that delegation matters, and different forms of delegation coupled with asymmetric costs will imply different degrees of government intervention.

Keywords

market share delegation sales delegation asymmetric cost export subsidy import tariff 

JEL Classification

D21 D42 F12 F13 L13 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Leonard F. S. Wang
    • 1
  • Ya-Chin Wang
    • 2
  • Lihong Zhao
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of Applied EconomicsNational University of KaohsiungKaohsiungRepublic of China
  2. 2.Department of Finance and BankingKun Shan UniversityTainan HsienRepublic of China
  3. 3.Jinhe Center for Economic ResearchXi’an Jiaotong UniversityXi’anPeople’s Republic of China

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