When Should an Incumbent be Obliged to Share its Infrastructure with an Entrant Under the General Competition Rules?
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According to the essential-facilities doctrine, competition law requires an infrastructural monopoly to provide access. Under the “Bronner criterion”, proposed by the EC Court, the doctrine is only applicable when a symmetric infrastructural duopoly is non-viable. This paper uses a simple model to illustrate that, from a welfare point-of-view, the Bronner criterion may provide too little monopoly protection for the incumbent in high-risk new markets, while requiring too much investments from the entrant in low-risk mature markets.
Keywordsinfrastructure access regulation competition law antitrust bronner
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