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When Should an Incumbent be Obliged to Share its Infrastructure with an Entrant Under the General Competition Rules?

  • Mats A. Bergman
Original Article

Abstract

According to the essential-facilities doctrine, competition law requires an infrastructural monopoly to provide access. Under the “Bronner criterion”, proposed by the EC Court, the doctrine is only applicable when a symmetric infrastructural duopoly is non-viable. This paper uses a simple model to illustrate that, from a welfare point-of-view, the Bronner criterion may provide too little monopoly protection for the incumbent in high-risk new markets, while requiring too much investments from the entrant in low-risk mature markets.

Keywords

infrastructure access regulation competition law antitrust bronner 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science Business Media, Inc. 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Swedish Competition Authority and Department of EconomicsStöckhölm University CollegeHuddingeSweden

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