Scientific Understanding, Fictional Understanding, and Scientific Progress

  • Seungbae ParkEmail author


The epistemic account and the noetic account hold that the essence of scientific progress is the increase in knowledge and understanding, respectively. Dellsén (J Gen Philos Sci 49(3):451–459, 2018) criticizes the epistemic account (Park in J Gen Philos Sci 48(4):569–579, 2017a) and defends the noetic account (Dellsén in Stud Hist Philos Sci 56(72):82, 2016). I argue that Dellsén’s criticisms against the epistemic account fail, and that his notion of understanding, which he claims requires neither belief nor justification, cannot explain scientific progress, although it can explain fictional progress in science-fiction.


Cognitive episode Means-end thesis Non-cognitive episode Restriction thesis 



I am grateful to the reviewers of journal for insightful comments. This work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2018S1A5A2A01039606).


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© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Ulsan National Institute of Science and TechnologyUlsanRepublic of Korea

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