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How to Formulate Scientific Realism and Antirealism

  • Seungbae ParkEmail author
Article
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Abstract

The wider the gap between rivaling positions, the more there can be debates between rivaling interlocutors. The gap between the respective formulations of scientific realism and antirealism that invoke the Prussian conception of rationality is wider than the gap between the respective formulations of scientific realism and antirealism that invoke the English conception of rationality. Therefore, scientific realists and antirealists should choose the former over the latter as the framework of their debate.

Keywords

Scientific antirealism English conception of rationality Prussian conception of rationality Scientific realism 

Notes

Acknowledgements

I thank three anonymous referees and the editors of this journal for useful comments. This work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2018S1A5A2A01039606).

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Ulsan National Institute of Science and TechnologyUlsanRepublic of Korea

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