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Rules, Intentions and Social Behavior: A Reassessment of Peter Winch

  • Jordi FairhurstEmail author
Article
  • 23 Downloads

Abstract

The aim of the present article is twofold. Firstly, it aims to study the problems arising from the notion of rule proposed by Peter Winch in The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy (1958) to account for all meaningful behavior. On the one hand, it will analyze the problems in the argument posed by Winch in order to state that all meaningful behavior is governed by rules. On the other hand, it will focus on the problems concerning his conception of rules and rule-following, with specific emphasis on pointing out the issues that arise from the criterion posed by Winch in order to determine when a rule is being followed. Secondly, it aims to reassess Winch’s proposal and reformulate, accommodate and define his notion of rule in an intentional account of meaningful behavior, thus solving the problems presented. In addition, it will provide a criterion that allows to determine when a rule is being followed.

Keywords

Peter Winch Social behavior Meaningful behavior Rules Rule-following Intention 

Notes

Acknowledgements

This work was supported by a grant of the Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte del Gobieno de España code FPU16/05569. Thank you to José L. Lujan and the two anonymous reviewers for the numerous helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Departamento de Filosofía y Trabajo Social, Facultad de Filosofía y LetrasUniversidad de las Islas Baleares (UIB)Palma de MallorcaSpain

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