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Evaluating Formal Models of Science

  • Michael ThickeEmail author
Article
  • 68 Downloads

Abstract

This paper presents an account of how to evaluate formal models of science: models and simulations in social epistemology designed to draw normative conclusions about the social structure of scientific research. I argue that such models should be evaluated according to their representational and predictive accuracy. Using these criteria and comparisons with familiar models from science, I argue that most formal models of science are incapable of supporting normative conclusions.

Keywords

Formal models of science Social epistemology Philosophy of science Scientific models 

Notes

References

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© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Bard Prison InitiativeBard CollegeTivoliUSA

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