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Journal for General Philosophy of Science

, Volume 50, Issue 2, pp 297–306 | Cite as

Ad Hoc Philosophy of Science

  • Thomas JohanssonEmail author
Discussion
  • 82 Downloads

Abstract

It has been shown that the concept of ad hocness is ambiguous when applied to natural science. Here, it is established that a similar ambiguity is present also when the concept is applied in a philosophical debate. Neil Tennant’s proposal for solving Fitch’s paradox has been accused for being ad hoc several times, and he has presented several defenses. In this paper, it is established that ad hocness is never defined, although each author uses different notions of the concept. And we see that no reason to adopt a certain notion is offered.

Keywords

Ad hoc Fitch’s paradox Philosophy of science 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Lund UniversityLundSweden
  2. 2.VikenSweden

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