Truth and Scientific Change

Article

Abstract

The paper seeks to answer two new questions about truth and scientific change: (a) What lessons does the phenomenon of scientific change teach us about the nature of truth? (b) What light do recent developments in the theory of truth, incorporating these lessons, throw on problems arising from the prevalence of scientific change, specifically, the problem of pessimistic meta-induction?

Keywords

Truth Scientific change Pessimistic meta-induction Dynamic correspondence Realism World-oriented holism 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy, 0119UCSDLa JollaUSA

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