There May Yet be Non-causal Explanations (of Particular Events)
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There are many putative counterexamples to the view that all scientific explanations are causal explanations. Using a new theory of what it is to be a causal explanation, Bradford Skow has recently argued that several of the putative counterexamples fail to be non-causal. This paper defends some of the counterexamples by showing how Skow’s argument relies on an overly permissive theory of causal explanations.
KeywordsCausal explanation Partial explanation The barometer Causal histories
I would like to thank Michael Bertrand, Marc Lange, Bradford Skow, and two anonymous reviewers for this journal for helpful comments on drafts of this paper. I would also like to thank those who participated in the reading group on non-causal explanations in the Spring of 2014 at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill for valuable discussions on these issues.
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