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Journal for General Philosophy of Science

, Volume 47, Issue 2, pp 377–384 | Cite as

There May Yet be Non-causal Explanations (of Particular Events)

  • Finnur DellsénEmail author
Discussion

Abstract

There are many putative counterexamples to the view that all scientific explanations are causal explanations. Using a new theory of what it is to be a causal explanation, Bradford Skow has recently argued that several of the putative counterexamples fail to be non-causal. This paper defends some of the counterexamples by showing how Skow’s argument relies on an overly permissive theory of causal explanations.

Keywords

Causal explanation Partial explanation The barometer Causal histories 

Notes

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Michael Bertrand, Marc Lange, Bradford Skow, and two anonymous reviewers for this journal for helpful comments on drafts of this paper. I would also like to thank those who participated in the reading group on non-causal explanations in the Spring of 2014 at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill for valuable discussions on these issues.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of PhilosophyUniversity College DublinDublinIreland

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