In this paper, we consider the problem, introduced by Ginsburgh and Zang (Games Econ Behav 43:322–325, 2003), of sharing the income from the sell of passes that allow the entrance in a set of museums. First, we recall some allocation rules and some properties presented in Ginsburgh and Zang (Mus Manag Curatorship 19:371–383, 2004), Béal and Solal (Rev Econ 61:1099–1109, 2010), Estévez-Fernández et al. (2010), and Casas-Méndez et al. (Eur J Oper Res 215:161–168, 2011). Then, we discuss them, finding the properties satisfied by each allocation rule. The analysis of a real-world example concludes the paper.
Museum pass problem Allocation rules Shapley value Bankruptcy
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The authors acknowledge the support of Direzione Settore Musei del Comune di Genova, in particular through Enrica Carelli, Giuliano Doria and Gabriella Taravacci. The authors acknowledge two anonymous reviewers for their useful comments.
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