Journal of Automated Reasoning

, Volume 43, Issue 3, pp 289–304 | Cite as

Social Choice Theory in HOL

Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite
  • Tobias NipkowEmail author


This article presents formalizations in higher-order logic of two proofs of Arrow’s impossibility theorem due to Geanakoplos. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is derived as a corollary. Lacunae found in the literature are discussed.


Social choice theory Arrow’s theorem Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem Higher-order logic Theorem proving 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institut für InformatikTechnische Universität MünchenMünchenGermany

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