Moral Standing of Animals and Some Problems in Veterinarian Ethics

  • Stefan SencerzEmail author


This paper discusses the Indirect Duties View implying that, when our actions have no negative effects on humans, we can treat animals any way we wish. I offer several criticisms of this view. Subsequently, I explore some implications of rejecting this view that rise in the contexts of animal research and veterinarian ethics.


Moral status of animals Duties to animals Indirect duties view Aquinas Kant Research ethics Veterinarian ethics 



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© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.HumanitiesTexas A&M University – CCCorpus ChristiUSA

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