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International Tax and Public Finance

, Volume 18, Issue 3, pp 322–336 | Cite as

Impure public goods, matching grant rates and income redistribution in a federation with decentralized leadership and imperfect labor mobility

  • Arthur J. CaplanEmail author
  • Emilson C. D. Silva
Article

Abstract

We examine the decentralized provision of an impure public good by regional governments in a federation similar in certain respects to both the European Union and the United States. The central authority redistributes income and provides matching grants on a per rate basis after it observes the regions’ contributions to the impure public good. Imperfectly mobile workers react to regional and central governments’ policies by establishing residence in their most preferred region. We show that the allocations of the impure public good and the population are generally efficient in a federation with decentralized leadership.

Keywords

Decentralized leadership Federations Redistribution Labor mobility Matching grants 

JEL Classification

D62 D64 H41 H73 H87 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Applied EconomicsUtah State UniversityLoganUSA
  2. 2.School of EconomicsGeorgia Institute of TechnologyAtlantaUSA

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