Economic integration and the choice of commodity tax base with endogenous market structures
This paper analyzes the choice of commodity tax base when countries set their taxes noncooperatively in a two-country symmetric reciprocal dumping model of intraindustry trade with free entry and trade costs. We show that the consumption base (destination principle) dominates the production base (origin principle) when trade costs are high or demand is linear. For lower levels of trade costs and nonlinear demand, the welfare ranking of the two tax bases is ambiguous. Hence, there is no clear preference for a tax principle with an ongoing movement toward closer economic integration.
KeywordsEconomic integration Commodity taxation Trade Imperfect competition Endogenous market structures
JEL ClassificationF12 H20
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