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Redistributive taxation and social insurance under adverse selection in the insurance market

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Abstract

This paper extends the analysis of optimal income taxation under uncertainty studied by Cremer and Pestieau (International Tax and Public Finance, 3, 281–295, 1996). We introduce asymmetric information in the insurance market whereby private insurance companies cannot identify the risk probability of the agents, and we examine its effect on public policy. We consider the separating equilibrium of Rothschild and Stiglitz (Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90, 629–649, 1976) and Riley (Econometrica, 47, 331–359, 1979) where the low risk agent is only partially insured. The presence of the distortion in the insurance market changes the affinity of labor, and in some cases, we show that the scope of redistribution and the resulting social welfare are higher under asymmetric information than under full information. We also show that the increase in social insurance affects the utility and labor incentive of the low risk type by relaxing the self-selection constraint in the insurance market. The policy implications of the redistributive taxation and social insurance are analytically and numerically examined.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Yokohama National University, Yokohama, Japan

    Yukihiro Nishimura

  2. Department of Economics, Queen’s University, Dunning Hall, Kingston, Ontario, K7L 3N6, Canada

    Yukihiro Nishimura

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  1. Yukihiro Nishimura
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Correspondence to Yukihiro Nishimura.

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Nishimura, Y. Redistributive taxation and social insurance under adverse selection in the insurance market. Int Tax Public Finance 16, 176–197 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-007-9062-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-007-9062-8

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