International Tax and Public Finance

, Volume 14, Issue 1, pp 55–69 | Cite as

Short-term leaders should make long-term appointments

Article

Abstract

Top decision-makers (such as the U.S. President) often serve short terms, but make decisions with consequences long after they are gone. (Appointments of judges or of Federal Reserve Board members are two examples.) When a leader can choose his effort on an appointment, the organization’s performance may increase when the minimum term for an appointment increases, and when decisions are irreversible. In addition, ideological preferences can lead to better appointments.

Keywords

Appointments Tenure Effort Ideology 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of California–IrvineIrvine
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsUniversity of HelsinkiHelsinkiFinland
  3. 3.CESifoMunich

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