International Tax and Public Finance

, Volume 12, Issue 4, pp 349–373 | Cite as

Toward A Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism

Article

Abstract

Drawing on a wide range of literature and ideas, a new “second-generation theory of fiscal federalism” is emerging that provides new insights into the structure and working of federal systems. After a restatement and review of the first-generation theory, this paper surveys this new body of work and offers some thoughts on the ways in which it is extending our understanding of fiscal federalism and on its implications for the design of fiscal institutions.

Keywords

fiscal federalism fiscal competition regional and local governments 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of MarylandUSA

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